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Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases)
CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW*
I. INTRODUCTION
I have often thought myself ill-suited to my chosen profession. I love to
argue, but I am often too quick to say both, "yes, I see your point" and
concede something to the "other side," and to say of my own arguments,
"yes, but, it's not that simple." In short, I have trouble with polarized
argument, debate, and the adversarialism that characterizes much of our
work. Where others see black and white, I often see not just the "grey" but
the purple and red-in short, the complexity of human issues that appear
before the law for resolution.
In the last decade or so, a polarized debate about how disputes should
be resolved has demonstrated to me once again the difficulties of simplistic
and adversarial arguments. Owen Fiss has argued "Against Settlement";1
Trina Grillo and others have argued against mediation (in divorce cases
and other family matters involving women);2 Richard Delgado and others
have questioned whether informal processes are unfair to disempowered
and subordinated groups;3 Judith Resnik has criticized the (federal) courts'
unwillingness to do their basic job of adjudication;4 Stephen Yeazell has
suggested that too much settlement localizes, decentralizes, and delegal-
izes dispute resolution and the making of public law;5 Kevin C. McMunigal
has argued that too much settlement will make bad advocates; 6 and David
Luban and Jules Coleman, among other philosophers, have criticized the
* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law and Georgetown University Law Center;
Co-Director, UCLA Center for Conflict Resolution.
1. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
2. See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J.
1545 (1991); see also Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics
of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441 (1992); Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The
Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984).
3. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359 (arguing that alternative dispute
resolution disadvantages minority disputants).
4. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982) [hereinafter Resnik,
Managerial Judges] (criticizing managerial role increasingly assumed by judges); Judith
Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986)
[hereinafter Resnik, Failing Faith] (advocating revision of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
5. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994
Wis. L. REV. 631 (describing consequences of decline in proportion of trials to filed civil
cases).
6. See Kevin C. McMunigal, The Costs of Settlement: The Impact of Scarcity of Adjudication
on Litigating Lawyers, 37 UCLA L. REV. 833 (1990) (arguing that lack of trial experience
among today's lawyers threatens effective functioning of litigators in legal system premised
on adjudication).
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moral value of the compromises that are thought to constitute legal settle-
ments.7 On the other side, vigorous proponents of alternative dispute
resolution,8 including negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and various hy-
brids of these forms of preadjudication settlement, criticize the economic
and emotional waste of adversarial processes and the cost, inefficiency,
and political difficulties of adjudication, as well as its draconian unfairness
in some cases.9
In my view, this debate, while useful for explicitly framing the underly-
ing values that support our legal system, has not effectively dealt with the
realities of modern legal, political, and personal disputes.'" For me, the
question is not "for or against" settlement (since settlement has become
7. See David Luban, Bargaining and Compromise: Recent Work on Negotiation and Informal
Justice, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 397 (1985) (discussing how negotiation requires the compro-
mise of principles); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO.
L.J. 2619 (1995) [hereinafter Luban, Settlements]; Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in
Settlements, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 102 (1986) (arguing that settlements are often morally
objectionable). See generally COMPROMISE IN ETHICS, LAW, AND POLITICS (J. Roland Pen-
nock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979) [hereinafter COMPROMISE IN ETHICS] (discussing
compromise in context of various disciplines).
8. I have often been included in this school by others, see Luban, Settlements, supra note 7,
at 2639 n.86, though I view myself, as indicated by the opening of this essay, as both a
proponent and a critic. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary
Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991)
[hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement] (discussing how adversarial system co-
opts and transforms innovations of dispute resolution); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and
Against Settlement: The Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 485 (1985) (discussing arguments for and against mandatory settlement conferences). I
combine the enthusiasm of a practitioner (as a mediator, negotiator, and arbitrator) with the
critical eye of the scholar looking at structural and long-term effects of the aggregation of
individual cases.
9. For a sampling of such arguments, see ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER,
THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION (1994) (arguing that mediation can transform disputants into
more psychologically and morally aware individuals); STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DIS-
PUTE RESOLUTION (2d ed. 1994) (giving overview of dispute resolution theory and practice);
D. Brock Hornby, Federal Court-Annexed ADR: After the Hoopla, FJC DIRECTIONS, Dec.
1994, at 26 (considering practical issues of federal court-annexed ADR); Andrew W.
McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660 (1985) (advocating
settlement as a means to reconciliation); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of
Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem-Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984) (describing
benefits of problem-solving negotiation); Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost
of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253 (1985) (advocating case management and ADR to contain
litigation costs); Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976)
(advocating variety of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to reduce judicial case-
load); David N. Smith, A Warmer Way of Disputing: Mediation and Conciliation, 26 (Supp.)
AM. J. COMP. L. 205 (1978) (describing emergence of mediation and conciliation process).
10. When learning that I was writing yet another "defense" of settlement in response to
continued critique of settlement, my colleague, Susan Gillig, remarked: "Those writing
against settlement might as well write about colonizing Mars-there may be value in it, but
with the 'three strikes and you're out' criminal laws and modern caseloads, civil adjudication
is becoming as likely as human life on Mars."
[Vol. 83:26632664
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the "norm" for our system)," but when, how, and under what circumstances
should cases be settled? When do our legal system, our citizenry, and the
parties in particular disputes need formal legal adjudication, and when are
their respective interests served by settlement, whether public orprivate?12
As several recent commentators have noted, the role of settlement in
our legal system has increased: 3 some think because it is actively pro-
moted by such developments as the Civil Justice Reform Act; 14 others by
simple caseload pressures, and still others because of the desirability of
party-initiated or consented-to agreements to resolve disputes. While court
administrators, judges, and some lawyers 15 suggest that we must continue
to mine the advantages of settlement for caseload reduction,' 6 or equity
11. For similar debates in the criminal justice system, see generally PAMELA J. UTZ,
SETTLING THE FACTS: DISCRETION AND NEGOTIATION IN CRIMINAL COURT (1978) (discussing
how different models of plea bargaining can be made more or less responsive to criminal
defendant and system needs); Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69
CAL. L. REV. 652 (1981) (arguing that plea bargaining is inherently unfair and irrational
process); Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services
and the Need for a Two-Tiered Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808 (1986)
(discussing how shortcomings of legal system have distorted settlement process).
12. As another "false dichotomy" in this debate, scholars often assume that settlements
are almost exclusively privately arranged and thus deprive the rest of us of: (1) access to
knowledge of the wrongdoing in particular cases; (2) the values assessed for settlements and
evaluation of injuries or harms; and (3) the precedential value of an enunciated principle for
resolving future disputes. Many settlements are, of course, public and recently have received
as much press attention and legal consideration as any published case. See, e.g., Warren
Brown, GM Settles 4 Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1995, at DI; Thomas M. Burton, New
Offer Readied in Breast Implant Case, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 1995, at B4; see also Symposium,
Mass Tortes: Just Desserts, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811 (1995) [hereinafter Cornell Symposium].
In my own contribution to that symposium, I argued for court and public scrutiny, with
standards, of some settlements. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of
Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159 (1995); see also William
Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order Out of Chaos, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
837 (1995) (suggesting criteria for court (and thus, public) review of class action settle-
ments).
13. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle". Judicial Promotion and Regula-
tion of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1994) (exploring merits of judicial promotion of
settlements); Yeazell, supra note 5, at 638-39.
14. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (requiring the development of civil justice
delay and cost reduction plans, authorizing creation of local advisory committees to consider
court policy, and encouraging variety of alternative dispute resolution techniques to accom-
plish these results); see Lauren K. Robel, Fractured Civil Procedure: The Justice Reform Act of
1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447 (1994) (arguing that Civil Justice Reform Act does not
authorize deviations from Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Lauren K. Robel, Grass Roots
Procedure: Local Advisory Groups and the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
879 (1993) (assessing success of Civil Justice Reform Act based on survey of Advisory Group
members).
15. See, e.g., Alternative Dispute Resolution Issue, FJC DIRECTIONS, Dec. 1994, at 1 (discuss-
ing development and use of alternative dispute resolution in federal courts).
16. A recent series of articles in the Journal of Legal Studies has begun to explore the
economics and efficiency of ADR from the perspective of litigants, judges, the legal system,
and larger society. It is important to recognize that not all of these classes of people or
institutions have the same interests, economically or otherwise. See generally Robert H.
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among claimants, especially in mass torts or class action settings, many
legal scholars continue to express concern with the use of settlement as a
device for resolving our legal disputes.17
The difficulty with the debate about settlement vs. adjudication is that
there are many more than two processes," as well as other variables that
affect the processes, to consider. The diverse interests of the participants
in the dispute,' 9 the legal system, and society may not be the same. Issues
of fairness, legitimacy, economic efficiency, privacy, publicity, emotional
catharsis or empathy,2 ° access, equity among disputants, and lawmaking
may differ in importance for different actors in the system, and they may
vary by case-this is the strength of our common law system.
In his accompanying essay, David Luban argues that settlement is prob-
Gertner & Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 87 (1995) (examining
settlement escrows as method to reduce delay and promote settlement); Bruce L. Hay,
Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1995) (examining role of
asymmetric information in determining outcome of trials); Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute
Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1995) (distinguishing between ex
ante ADR and ex post ADR). See also Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public
Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627 (1994) (arguing that judges'
self-interest in caseload reduction and elimination of "tedious" cases influences their
behavior); Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges' Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment on
Macey, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 647 (1994) (responding to Macey's arguments).
17. My colleague Stephen Yeazell is concerned that more and more cases are disposed of
either by settlement or by motion, thus reserving more and more power to lawyers and trial
judges, with little review and scrutiny by higher levels of the judiciary. Marc Galanter and
Mia Cahill, in reviewing the available empirical work on judicial promotion of settlements,
are skeptical of whether settlement proponents have established any strong evidence that
settlement itself is good policy-there are some costs and some benefits, but settlements,
like adjudication, are neither good nor bad. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 13, at 1387-91.
18. Recent scholarship on this subject continues to treat "adjudication" on the one hand
and "ADR" on the other as if they were uniform processes, even where they may "meld"
into each other. Modern scholars continue to conflate all ADR processes (even when
describing them as different, they continue to attribute the same qualities to all forms of
ADR) just as they view adjudication as if it were the same in a local small claims court in a
rural community and a federal district court in a major city (not to mention the differences in
"adjudicatory" effects of such rulings as summary judgment). See generally Judith Resnik,
Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J.
ON Disp. RESOL. 211 (1995) (examining and conflating attitudes towards ADR and adjudica-
tion).
19. For example, cost savings for litigants in individual cases may result in larger costs for
the system if ADR is offered by the courts. See generally Shavell, supra note 16, at 24
(examining why parties use ADR and what social interest is in ADR).
20. There has been a slight increase in the attention paid to the emotional aspects of
disputing in recent scholarly and practical writing about settlements. See, e.g., E. ALLAN
LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988) (examin-
ing standards for evaluation of different processes and procedures); JACK B. WEINSTEIN,
INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION (1995) (describing practical issues faced by
participants in mass tort litigation); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Measuring Both the Art and
Science of Mediation, 9 NEGOTIATION J. 321 (1993) (examining standards for evaluation of
mediators and suggesting that empathy and empathy training are essential parts of media-
tion process); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Altruism Possible in Lawyering?, 8 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 385 (1992) (discussing how adversary system suppresses altruism and human empathy).
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lematic because it reduces public participation in the business of dispute
resolution and, consequently, reduces production of rules and prece-
dents-in short, settlement leads to an "erosion of the public realm., 21
Settlement works in favor of "private peace" and in opposition to "public
justice."22 Luban, like other critics of settlement, suggests that the legal
system is designed to engage us (and our judges, lawyers, and litigants) in
the public discourse of lawmaking and policy debate that concerns itself
with justice and self-defined societal values-in our case, democratic delib-
eration. By judging and enunciating rules, judges set baselines for political
endowments and entitlements and alternately close and open debates by
reviewing facts and articulating the rules and values that underlie particu-
lar legal positions.2 3 Settlements, on the other hand, represent cruder
"compromises" of raw bargaining skill and extrajudicial power imbalances
(economics, legal skill, and repeat play experience). Luban acknowledges
that we can no longer imagine a "world without settlement." We need it
simply to muddle through the hundreds of thousands of disputes our
modern society produces. Unlike Fiss, he acknowledges that not all dis-
putes are occasions for "structural transformation" or public elucidation
of basic values. 24 And, as he suggests realistically, "[t]oo many cases will
21. Luban, Settlements, supra note 7, at 2619.
22. Others, like Laura Nader, have decried for years the emphasis on "harmony" values
over "justice" values, for particular individual disputants, as well as for the public. See, e.g.,
Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in the
Movement to Re-Form Dispute Resolution, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1 (1993) (criticizing
acquiescence to ADR and harmony ideology).
23. See Luban, Settlements, supra note 7, at 2637.
24. Id. at 2631. Having just spent two months mediating auto accident cases in Los
Angeles civil courts, I am struck by the difficulty of characterizing disputes. On one hand, all
of these cases were "simple" car accidents: factual disputes about small amounts of money,
with issues ranging from full liability disputes to disagreements about the value of medical
expenses and property damage. The parties simply wanted their money in most cases (at
least as articulated by their respective lawyers). On the other hand, however, any single one
of these cases could also be taken as representative of any number of very important public
or democratic issues. Insurance companies were clamping down on alleged widespread fraud
by plaintiffs, their doctors, and their lawyers in overclaiming. See STEPHEN CARROLL ET AL.,
RAND CORPORATION, THE COSTS OF EXCESS MEDICAL CLAIMS FOR AUTOMOBILE PERSONAL
INJURIES 3-4 (1995) (describing extent of excess claiming by auto accident victims). Virtually
all of these disputes involved the multicultural/racial issues that are sub rosa in increasingly
diverse Los Angeles. Lawyers made arguments about how the racial composition of juries
would affect the valuation of cases. And standards of human behavior and responsibility
were constantly being negotiated in these sessions, both with reference to the law "on the
books" and in reality (i.e., "Get real, nobody stops at a yellow light or even slows down at a
busy intersection in L.A."). Thus, ironically, I now find myself more in agreement with Owen
Fiss than in the past. It is not only our larger "structural" lawsuits that raise important issues
of public values, but even the "smallest" of cases has significant public, as well as private,
possibilities of value clarification. If, as in my ideal world, disputes were not so easily
monetized, see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 791, 795, the occasion for articulation of
values would be even greater-when should we apologize, take responsibility, and provide
care and other nonmonetary items in resolution of a dispute?
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make bad law.",25 With an increase of cases, and trial and appeals courts
making more and more law, there are likely to be irreconcilable inconsisten-
cies in decisional law, producing a virtual "tower of Babel" of legal
precedents.26
Thus Luban shifts the focus to a consideration of when and how settle-
ments should take place. His ultimate focus is on the need to keep
settlements public and to decry the loss to democratic discourse when too
many settlements are kept secret. 27 Luban argues.that secret settlements
deprive us not only of "result" information, but the "facts" of discovery,
necessarily "privatizing" information to which a democratic society should
have access. He suggests that those who continue to favor secret settle-
ments prefer the "problem-solving" (dispute resolution) conception of our
legal system to "public production of rules and precedents" or the "public
goods and discourse" function. Thus Luban is willing to tolerate settle-
ment, but only if it is open to the "sunshine" laws and serves "at least
some of the public values of adjudication,, 28 by keeping the settlement
process and its information open to the public.
In this essay, I hope to explore some of the same questions that Profes-
sor Luban has framed for us-how can we decide which settlements to be
for and which to be against? In other words, how can we tell good
settlements from bad ones, and when should we prefer adjudication to
settlement? Like others who have written on this subject, both recently
29
and in the past,3" I do not think there are easy answers to this question;
but more problematically, I want to suggest that it will be very difficult for
us to specify in advance criteria for allocation to particular processes. In
the words of current academic cachet, much depends on the context-of
25. Luban, Settlements, supra note 7, at 2646.
26. Id. at 2642-46.
27. This issue is controversial and gaining increasing attention, not only from scholars, but
also from the Judicial Conference (which recently debated changes to the rules on protective
orders, see Saundra Torry, Judges Reject Record-Secrecy Rule, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1995, at
A8), state legislatures, and judiciaries, which are debating changes in rules of civil procedure
and substantive regulation of secrecy and access to settlements. See Wayne D. Brazil,
Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 955 (1988) (describ-
ing circumstances in which courts permit discovery and admission at trial of confidential
settlement negotiations); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Public Access to Private Settlements: Con-
flicting Legal Policies, 11 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 85 (1993) (noting increasing
number of states revising civil discovery rules to allow more public access); Arthur R. Miller,
Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427
(1991) (arguing against reform of discovery rules that would limit judges' discretion to issue
protective orders).
28. Luban, Settlements, supra note 7, at 2659.
29. See, e.g., Galanter & Cahill, supra note 13; Luban, Settlements, supra note 7; Yeazell,
supra note 5.
30. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353
(1978) [hereinafter Fuller, Adjudication]; Lon L. Fuller, Mediation: Its Forms and Functions,
44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971) [hereinafter Fuller, Mediation].
[Vol. 83:26632668
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disputes, of disputants, and of the system being considered. I will here
complexify and problematize Luban's seemingly easy proposition-that
democratic discourse requires full disclosure of legal dispute information.
In this essay, I will make a case for settlement by arguing that there are
philosophical, as well as instrumental, democratic, ethical, and human
justifications for settlements (at least in some cases).
Those who criticize settlement suffer from what I have called, in other
contexts, "litigation romanticism,"3 with empirically unverified assump-
tions about what courts can or will do. More important, those who privi-
lege adjudication focus almost exclusively on structural and institutional
values and often give short shrift to those who are actually involved in the
litigation. I fear, but am not sure, that this debate can be reduced to those
who care more about the people actually engaged in disputes versus those
who care more about institutional and structural arrangements.32 I prefer
to think that we need both adjudication and settlement. These processes
can affect each other in positive, as well as negative ways, but in my view,
settlement should not be seen as "second best" or "worst case" when
adjudication fails. 33 Settlement can be justified on its own moral grounds-
there are important values, consistent with the fundamental values of our
legal and political systems, that support the legitimacy of settlements of
some, if not most, legal disputes. These values include consent, participa-
31. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 12, at 1173.
32. This dichotomy worries me for many reasons, but it continues to replicate itself often
in these debates. Many who are critical of mediation and other "conflict handling" processes
assume that ADR cannot effectuate social change, see Mark Chesler, Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Social Justice, in INJUSTICE, SOCIAL CONFLICT AND SOCIAL CHANGE (E. Lewis
& E. Douvan eds., 1994); Susan Silbey & Austin Sarat, Dispute Processing in Law and Legal
Scholarship: From Institutional Critique to the Reconstruction of the Juridical Subject, 66 DENV.
U. L. REV. 437 (1989), and that settlement and ADR are only for individual disputes or for
"therapeutic" purposes; service goals that are often described as hierarchically inferior to
"bigger" questions of social justice and legal institutions. This ignores a fundamental
relationship between disputants and the larger system. If disputants cannot get what they
want from the justice system, they will simply not file claims and not use the system. For an
eloquent elaboration of the relationship of formal legal systems to informal dispute resolu-
tion in the context of sexual harassment, see Howard Gadlin, Adapting Mediation for Sexual
Harassment Complaints, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS: A GUIDE FOR ADMINISTRA-
TORS, FACULTY AND STUDENTS (Bernice Sandier & Robert Shoop eds., 1995).
It could be argued that Luban's concern with individual versus structural aspects of
disputes replicates a variety of common dualisms in legal thinking and practice-i.e.,
public-private interests in lawmaking. The debate feels a lot like my experience in legal
services practice with contrasts in individual case work versus "structural law reform"
litigation. See generally JACK KATZ, POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION (1982) (describ-
ing perceived dichotomy between individual and system-wide legal service work). Cf. Marc
Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor, 83 GEo. L.J. 1529 (1995) (arguing that
Legal Services lawyers subscribe to dogma that divides legal activity into impact work and
service work).
33. Sam Gross and Kent Syverud describe trials as "failed settlements." Samuel R. Gross
& Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of
Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319 (1991) (examining empirically pretrial negotiations).
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tion, empowerment, dignity, respect, empathy and emotional catharsis,
privacy, efficiency, quality solutions, equity, access, and yes, even justice.
Though some have argued that compromise itself can be morally justi-
fied,34 I will here argue, as well, that compromise is not always necessary
for settlement and that in fact, some settlements, by not requiring compro-
mise, may produce better solutions than litigation. In particular, my own
arguments for settlements (of particular kinds) have been often misstated
or oversimplified, for the purpose of argument, so that they begin to strike
me as strawpersons and cause me to question whether we are really able to
understand each other when we "sharpen" the argument by "narrowing"
it.
35
To summarize, it seems to me that the key questions implicated in the
ongoing debate about settlement vs. adjudication are:
1. In a party-initiated legal system, when is it legitimate for the parties to
settle their dispute themselves, or with what assistance from a court in
which they have sought some legal-system support or service?
2. When is "consent" to a settlement legitimate and "real," and by what
standards should we (courts and academic critics) judge and permit
such consent? 3
6
3. When, in a party-initiated legal system, should party consent be
"trumped" by other values-in other words, when should public,
institutional, and structural needs and values override parties' desire
to settle or courts' incentives to promote settlement? In short, when is
the need for "public adjudication" or as Luban suggests, "public
34. See, e.g., Arthur Kuflik, Morality and Compromise, in COMPROMISE IN ETHICS, supra
note 7, at 63.
35. In particular, authors who have "reduced" my arguments for settlement as solely a
"needs-based" argument for settlement, see, e.g., Galanter & Cahill, supra note 13, at 1359;
Silbey & Sarat, supra note 32, at 485, or a "problem-solving-satisfaction" mode of dispute
settlement, see, e.g., BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 9, at 58; Luban, Settlements, supra note 7, at
2632 & n.60, fail to account for my analysis of the politics and ethics of settlement. See
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 829-40.
There are two themes of critique that I have taken very seriously and that do seem to raise
significant practical problems with the theoretical bases of my arguments for settlements.
Several critics have cogently suggested that the model of negotiated settlements that I (and
others, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed.
1991)) describe are "idealized" versions of how settlements might be achieved-they do not
describe the empirical reality of lawyer negotiations. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 13, at
1359-60. More concretely, Herbert Kritzer has demonstrated that even if lawyers wanted to
be "pie-expanding, creative problem-solvers," the structure of the contingent fee arrange-
ment serves to monetize disputes and creates disincentives for anything but monetary
solutions to legal problems. Herbert M. Kritzer, Fee Arrangements and Negotiations, 21 LAW
& Soc'Y REv. 341 (1987).
36. Note that the answer to this question remains doctrinally distinct for criminal plea
bargains, civil individual actions, class actions and court reviews of some, but not all
settlements.
[Vol. 83:26632670
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settlement ' '37 more important (to whom?) than what the parties maythemselves desire? 38
II. WHY Do CASES SETTLE? SOME ARGUMENTS FOR THE JUSTIFICATION
OF SETTLEMENT OVER ADJUDICATION
I begin with two important caveats. First, both categories of "settle-
ment" and "adjudication" contain enough variation within them to make
them almost meaningless concepts to compare in the abstract. The con-
duct of negotiated settlements and various stages along the adjudication
spectrum include such variations of lawyer experience, skill and resources,
party motivations and resources, and legal system endowments (both proce-
dural and substantive) that we must, for the purposes of argument, con-
sider these categories as little more than "ideal types." Thus, like David
Luban and others I have criticized, for the purposes of this essay, I too will
treat these categories of legal process as if they were meaningful categories
of comparison, although I believe there is as much variation within these
groups as between them.
Second, although I believe it is most important to understand these
variations by using rigorous empirical study,3 9 in this essay I will be
offering mostly theoretical justifications for settlement, which will require
further empirical verification.4 ° I want to underscore that such empirical
verification is essential if we are to get past the overly generalized and
abstracted claims made both for and against settlement.4 1 In responding to
37. This is how I read Luban's claim that settlements should not be "secret."
38. Notice that it is virtually impossible to frame these questions in value-neutral ways.
The philosophical and policy issues implicated are circular. Parties may seek resolution of
their disputes, but we can't be sure that they have really consented to the process they use
for settlement, especially when courts are so overburdened that a trial is prohibitively
expensive and too long in coming. Similarly, we may think some issue needs a "public
discourse" or decision, but none of the disputants may want to "step up to the plate" to have
their private lives be the material of the public dispute. (Despite all the reported cases, this
is typically a problem in many employment discrimination and sexual harassment suits.)
39. And thus I applaud the efforts of those researchers reported in Galanter and Cahill's
excellent review of the complicated "state of the art" in empirical settlement research. See
Galanter & Cahill, supra note 13. For a look at a recent attempt to conduct a rigorous
analysis of one court's efforts to create a systematic ADR program, see Joshua D. Rosenberg
& H. Jay Folberg, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Empirical Analysis, 46 STAN. L. REV.
1487 (1994) (presenting study of ADR program in Northern District of California).
40. I will also be offering some limited qualitative empirical support for my claims from
two small scale studies of mediation and from my own observations as a neutral third party
in a variety of settlement settings.
41. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Durkheimian Epiphanies: The Importance of
Engaged Social Science in Legal Studies, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 91 (1990) (discussing
importance of empirical research about law and its operation and its relation to legal
education). The particular ADR programs developed by federal courts under the Civil
Justice Reform Act are currently being evaluated in two studies conducted by the Federal
Judicial Center and the RAND Corporation. Final reports are due to be submitted to
Congress in 1996.
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David Luban's important and significant arguments, I want to discuss some
of the objections to and defenses of settlement.
A. SETTLEMENT IS NOT NECESSARILY UNPRINCIPLED COMPROMISE
In the criticism of settlement there is a common theme of the unseemli-
ness of "compromise," considered by most writers to connote some weak-
ness of will, morality, or principle.42 Here I wish to respond to the critique
of settlement as "weak-willed" or "illegitimate compromise" in two sepa-
rate ways. First, I want to make the case (again) that settlement need not
be compromise at all, when "compromise" connotes the giving up of
something in return for the other parties' concessions.43 Galanter and
Cahill make this conceptual and definitional error when they describe one
of the positive aspects of settlement as its achievement of "the golden
mean": "Settlement typically involves arriving at a position between the
original offers and demands of the parties. Thus, it involves a process of
compromise in the sense that each has sacrificed some part of his claim in
order to secure another part."44
Indeed, as I shall argue, adjudication, with its binary or win-loss solu-
tions, more often produces situations in which both parties and the system
may have to "give up" some legitimate claims in order to terminate the
dispute (as when issues are increasingly narrowed and monetized), while
settlements may enable the broadening or increasing of issues for "trade"
or resolution and more party interests can actually be achieved without
having to "give something up." Classic illustrations in the settlement
literature include the dividing of goods, not in half, but by interest, so that
a piece of chocolate cake is divided into cake and icing,4 5 a window in
another room is opened to create airflow without a draft,4 6 and the Sinai
Peninsula is not divided at all but is neutralized with security.4 7 Parties
42. See, e.g., Martin P. Golding, The Nature of Compromise, in COMPROMISE IN ETHICS,
supra note 7, at 5 (arguing that each party to compromise must recognize some moral
legitimacy in other's case).
43. As my colleague Jon Varat's son, Adam, once said, remarking that he and his sister
did not have to eat the same food to sit down to dinner together: "How can it be a
negotiation if we both don't have to give something up?"
44. Galanter & Cahill, supra note 13, at 1371. This statement also conflates two aspects of
compromise typical in the literature-compromise as a process of mutual concessions or
cooperative or coordinated activity and compromise as a result (i.e., a split-the-difference
solution). Neither necessarily entails the other. For example, see Golding's description of
literal "log-rolling" in which a motorist assists a farmer in removing a log fallen in the road
that neither has the strength to move alone. The motorist and the farmer "coordinate" or
"cooperate" in a process of physical effort so that the motorist can continue his journey and
the farmer can cut the tree for firewood or other uses. Thus, both achieve their respective
ends without "giving anything up." Golding, supra note 42, at 13-14.
45. See Menkei-Meadow, supra note 9, at 771.
46. See FISHER & URY, supra note 35, at 40.
47. See id. at 41-42.
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who identify their complementary, not necessarily competitive, needs and
interests can achieve more of what they want by trading for what they
value more but what the other party values less.48 Thus, "compromise" in
Galanter and Cahill's sense, like litigation outcomes that award all or
nothing, assume we all value the same thing equally. If we don't actually
value the same things equally, then negotiated settlement is more demo-
cratic: it allows the full representation of our real needs and interests by
permitting fuller expression of those interests and by allowing "trades" or
non-"split-the-difference" divisions that more accurately track party de-
sires and facilitate outcomes that maximize, rather than minimize or
compromise, party goals.
Second, even granting that some settlements will look like "compro-
mises" in which certain issues or interests are traded or "given up" for
dispute resolution or for other purposes, some compromise itself can be
justified on moral, political, and philosophical grounds, and is often more
satisfactory to the parties and "better" for the legitimacy of the legal
system. Negotiated compromises are not lawless, rightless "give-aways," as
the antisettlement literature too often assumes.4 9 Indeed, on this point of
critique the arguments are often contradictory-either settlements are bad
because they simply represent the results of brute bargaining power or
they are unprincipled ("split-the-difference" solutions). Note, however,
that they cannot often be both at the same time. Why would someone with
sufficient bargaining power to "win" give up half? Indeed, as philosopher
Martin Golding has suggested, a "split-the-difference" compromise actu-
ally connotes a certain moral legitimacy or recognition of "equality" by the
parties. If the parties had rational, principled, or moral reasons, or enough
brute strength (including economic resources) to win a dispute, why would
they accede "half' to the other side unless the settlement recognized some
equal rational, principled, moral, or power-based reason for doing so?5"
48. See generally GEORGE C. HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1961); I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN &
MAUREEN R. BERMAN, THE PRACTICAL NEGOTIATOR 13-14, 174-76 (1982) (noting that
parties tend to try to fit their differing valuations of items into common decision). A most
vivid illustration of Homans's principle-that human needs are often complementary, not
competitive-was brought home to me when I was describing my work on negotiation to
colleagues at a faculty cocktail party some years ago. Slowly the bowl of cocktail snacks was
worn down as we picked our way through nuts, pretzels, wheatchex, popcorn, puffed rice,
raisins, and goldfish, each of us choosing our favorite-there was no competition at all! The
variety of human tastes permitted us to consume the available goods evenly without a single
conflict or competitive preference. I realize the real world does not often provide the variety
necessary to permit expression of such different interests, but it still is useful to consider how
"expanding" rather than "limiting" what is available can reduce the need for "split-the-
difference" compromises of single or more limited goods.
49. For an eloquent argument that legal negotiations provide their own internal ethics of
truthfulness and legitimation, see Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethics of
Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (1989).
50. See Golding, supra note 42, at 17.
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The concern that settlements deprive both litigants and the larger public
realm of normatively based solutions lies at the core of Luban's and Fiss's
criticisms. Yet I would argue that a settlement process may actually be
more "just" in the need for both less compromise and less narrowing of
legally cognizable issues. That the parties will "compromise" without
principle assumes two things: First, that items in dispute are valued equally
by the parties, and second, that agreement requires giving them up. The
legal system that Luban, Fiss, and others extol, however, is largely respon-
sible for reducing most legal disputes, not to disputes of public values and
resource allocation, but to monetized disputes about dollars. When they
are submitted to judges and juries with such legal principles as compara-
tive negligence, these monetized disputes are just as likely to result in
"split-the-difference" results in court as settlement. 51 Noncompromise
settlements offer the promise that more than money can be at stake and
that the parties can negotiate such other items as future relationships and
conduct, apologies, in-kind trade, new contracts, etc. In my view, it is
litigation, not settlement, 52 that has led to monetization of disputes, for
money has become the proxy for all legal harms and hurts.53 Judges and
juries award dollars when they cannot order behavior that parties will
agree to undertake on their own.5 4
More often and more troubling to those who are concerned about
justice, a litigated outcome will produce binary win-lose results that often
do not capture the "just reality." As John E. Coons argued so elegantly
many years ago, compromise (or at least nonbinary solutions) may repre-
sent more "precise justice" when we cannot be absolutely certain about
the facts, or when competing principles of law dictate different and some-
times opposed underlying values.55 Coons argued that courts (as well as
settling parties) should be allowed to render fifty-fifty or other allocative
verdicts when either unresolved factual doubt or legal ambiguities or
contradictions make winner-take-all results unjust." Thus, for me, untillitigation is permitted to recognize the ambiguities and contradictions in
51. For an eloquent argument that this is a good thing, that the legal system distorts with
its need for noncompromised results, see John E. Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed
Compromise: The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U. L. REV. 750 (1964) [hereinafter
Coons, Approaches] (discussing court-imposed compromise in civil litigation); John E. Coons,
Compromise as Precise Justice, in COMPROMISE IN ETHICS, supra note 7, at 190 [hereinafter
Coons, Compromise] (defining compromise in civil litigation).
52. See Luban, Settlements, supra note 7, at 2646-47.
53. Luban and Kritzer are right that the structure of attorneys' fees strongly influences
what disputes can be about. To the extent that the contingent fee must be paid from money,
there is little incentive to bargain for or litigate for nonmonetary items. See Kritzer, supra
note 35, at 345.
54. I argue this at some length in Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9.
55. See Coons, Compromise, supra note 51, at 190; Coons, Approaches, supra note 51, at
754-73.
56. One can see comparative negligence as an expression of this concern.
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modern life by developing a broader "remedial imagination,, 57 settlement
offers the opportunity to craft solutions that do not compromise, but offer
greater expression of the variety of remedial possibilities in a postmodern
world. 8
Yet another objection to "compromise" settlements is the assumption
that they are unprincipled. Various settlement critics have attempted to
document that settlements do not track legal principles and that negotia-
tors do not even appeal to legal endowments when settling cases. Robert
Condlin has analyzed student negotiations to demonstrate the lack of
appeal to law and principles in arguments made.59 Social scientist Herbert
Kritzer has uncovered a pattern of "low intensity" exchange of offers in
civil litigation that are made with little reference to the law.6 ° Janet
Cooper Alexander has demonstrated that securities litigation is often
settled for economic and strategic reasons that bear no relationship to the
legal merits.6' These empirical findings seem to suggest that negotiators do
not look to legal principles as the bases for resolving disputes. But these
findings are counter to arguments made more theoretically by those who
have argued that negotiations are in fact rule- and norm-based,62 as well as
norm-creating, and that legal endowments in fact structure what happens
in out-of-court settlements. Indeed, the often-used evocative phrase "bar-
gaining in the shadow of the law," coined by Robert Mnookin and Lewis
Kornhauser to describe divorce negotiations, 63 was meant to convey how
57. I have used this phrase to characterize the limited jurisdictional power of courts to
award only money damages, guilt or innocence binary verdicts, or limited injunctive relief.
See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 791.
58. I will soon make an argument that our adversary system is ill-suited to the twentieth-
century postmodern observations that reality is not accurately expressed or found in dual-
isms or binary oppositions. Complex social and legal problems need complex (not binary)
solutions. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble With the Adversary System in a Post-
Modern, Multi-Cultural World, (forthcoming presentation at Legal Ethics: The Core Issues,
Conference at Hofstra University Law School, Mar. 10, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with The Georgetown Law Journal); see also PAULINE M. ROSENAU, POST-MODERNISM
AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1992).
59. Robert J. Condlin, "Cases on Both Sides" Patterns of Argument in Legal Dispute-
Resolution, 44 MD. L. REV. 65 (1985).
60. HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET'S MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION
PROCESS IN ORDINARY LITIGATION 30-57 (1991) (describing negotiation and bargaining in
litigation). See generally HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDI-
NARY LITIGATION (1990) (examining work of ordinary lawyers in ordinary litigation).
61. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991) (arguing that settlements of securities litigation
are often not reflective of regulatory and legal norms but represent settlements based on
nuisance value, transaction costs, and attorney fee incentives).
62. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement
and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1976) (examining how principles, rules, and
precedents operate in private negotiation).
63. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (examining how rules and procedures used in court
for adjudicating disputes affect negotiations between divorcing couples outside courtroom).
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much legal rules and bargaining endowments limit and constrain what
occurs in private settlements. How can these claims be reconciled?
. For those who lament the seeming absence of law or rule in settlements,
several ironies are at work. First, in complaining that law does not seem to
govern either settlement arguments or settlement outcomes, there is an
underlying assumption that the law is just or fair and is the appropriate
measure by which all disputes should be resolved. I say this is ironic
because many of the critics of settlement are also critics of law (in particu-
lar instances)64 and thus should recognize the important critical and demo-
cratic function of a system of dispute resolution (settlement) that serves to
criticize, avoid, or correct laws that some find unjust, inefficient,, or just
plain inapplicable. Second, and related to this first irony, is an unstated
assumption that if law is the baseline for "justice" in settlements, then
majoritarian enacted laws (by legislatures) are just for all-an unstated
claim made by those who are often critical of the majoritarian enactments
of law.
The more thoughtful of the settlement critics (particularly Stephen
Yeazell and Judith Resnik) 65 have begun to realize the "dialogic" or
interactive relation between adjudication and settlement processes. What
now requires recognition is that the interaction or supplementation works
not only at the process level, but at the substantive level. Joint custody in
divorce began as a settlement "compromise" to the draconian and severe
effects of single physical custody66 and then became enacted in law
67
where it is now being questioned again.68 Thus, people may choose settle-
ment precisely because legislatively enacted "legal" solutions do not meet
the underlying needs or interests of parties in particular cases. Through
individually adaptive solutions in settlement we may see the limits of law
and explore avenues for law reform. Settlement (and its sometime rejec-
tion of law) could just as easily be seen as a democratic expression of
individual justice where ruled made for the aggregate would either be
unjust, or simply irrelevant to the achievement of justice in individual
cases. Settlement is, thus, not "unprincipled," but may be seen as a
64. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 160-74 (1988)
(defending moral activism in lawyers and urging legal reform); DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL
MODERNISM 209-82 (1994) (arguing for importance of challenges to law); Judith Resnik,
Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837 (1984) (arguing against legal limitations on jurisdiction,
appellate access, and habeas corpus).
65. See generally Yeazell, supra note 5; Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 4; Resnik,
Failing Faith, supra note 4.
66. Katherine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and the Dependency
Dilemma, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1986) (defending joint custody against feminist
criticisms).
67. In some states, like California, as a presumption. See CAL. FAM, CODE § 3080 (West
1994).
68. See, e.g., Lynn Smith, Shuttle Diplomacy, L.A. TIMES, May 24, 1995, at El (detailing
problems associated with joint custody).
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questioning of particular principles or the application of different individu-
ally adaptive principles.69
A related unstated assumption is that the only legitimate measure of
principle in settlement is law. But settlements may draw our attention to
the importance of other, nonlegal, principles that affect decisionmaking
and govern human behavior. Janet Cooper Alexander's work reveals that
there is a logic to the settlement of securities class actions-most often
economic, not legal, logic. Thus, parties may use settlement precisely to
have other, nonlegal, principles structure their disputes and relationships.
I have argued extensively elsewhere 71 that people and entities in disputes
may have a wide variety of interests (of which legal principles may be one
class) and may decide that, in any given case, social, psychological, eco-
nomic, political, moral, or religious principles should govern the resolution
of their dispute. This does not mean that such dispute resolution is not
principled-it is just not law-principled. To the extent that law is often
seen as a "metaprinciple" in our law-infused society, settlement provides
another democratic point of critique. If two kinds of principles clash in a
particular dispute,7' some solution will have to be found-a new "metaprin-
ciple," a compromise or trading of principles, persuasion that one prin-
ciple should govern, or a practical solution that meets the goals of the
parties without formal articulation of an agreed-to principle. These varia-
tions on legal principles do not mean that settlements are not principled-
only that they may be based on "nonlegal" principles that may be just as
fair or just (if not more so) in particular cases.
Finally, it is too extreme to suggest that settlements are all unprincipled
compromises without the force of legal authority or legitimacy. Even those
settlements that actively and intentionally seem to depart from the law are
accomplished precisely because a potential legal result has been consid-
ered (and is, thus, still a reference point) and has been rejected. If one
party does not accede to the settlement, the default is to return to law, so
69. In this sense, I have often thought of interest-based negotiation and mediation as a
legacy of legal realism. They are adaptive expressions of the interaction of the "law on the
books" with the needs and interests of real people conducting transactions or having
disputes.
70. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 801-04.
71. I have always had trouble with Fisher and Ury's notion that negotiators should rely on
"objective criteria." See FISHER & URY, supra note 35, at 81-94. What if the "objective
criteria" are arguable or indeterminate, like so much legal argument? Consider the argu-
ments that insureds have with their insurers about such "objective criteria" as "blue-book
value" vs. "replacement value," or "cost" or "market value." In law we have only to look at
the constitutional clashes in freedom of speech and equality, see, e.g., CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993), abortion, see, e.g., KRISTEN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE
POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984), the right to bear arms and police powers, and affirmative
action and antidiscrimination remedies to see that appeals to "legal principles" do not
always successfully conclude or resolve the dispute.
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72law remains, in a sense, a constant baseline of choice and comparison.
Furthermore, many "settlements" are made not in "the shadow of the
law," but in the "shadow of the courthouse" where the parties request or
require court approval or management and thus invite some legal supervi-
sion.73
We should continue to discuss whether rules and principles are fair,
whether "giving up" something is necessary or justified, whether rules
should be sharply delineated or allow more discretion and elasticity to
meet the needs of particular circumstances, and what principles should
govern particular situations. But these questions are not illuminated by a
falsely simplistic model of settlements as unprincipled and unjust compro-
mises, when settlements are not necessarily unprincipled or inefficient
compromises.74 Indeed, just as David Luban argues that adjudication is
the process by which legislative compromises are unraveled, reinterpreted,
and redressed, 75 settlement is the process by which law created by adjudica-
tion is readjusted to meet the requirements of particular parties. In short,
it may be that none of the processes of lawmaking, interpretation, and
dispute resolution is more "holy" than another in the degree of compro-
mise or principle by which it operates. 76 Historically and generatively, they
supplement, critique, and affect each other, much as our notions of separa-
tion of power and checks and balances structure our multipart government.
B. SETTLEMENT DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE USE OR CREATION OF
PRECEDENT
Those who critique the lack of rules and principles and the "mushiness"
of nondefinitive rulings also lament what they perceive to be the absence
72. This statement, of course, assumes that the parties know what the "legal" results
would be and have the resources to effectuate them if they so choose. These are very big
assumptions.
73. This is the case in court-supervised settlements, such as class action settlement
approvals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) and settlements that seek court
imprimaturs. See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Assoc. v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc., 800
F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1986). Consider also that some cases that are not tried still have a court or
law-based resolution-such as summary judgment or other dispositive motion judgments that
are "adjudicative" without trial and often are law-based. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudica-
tion to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 162-63 (1986) (describing
adjudicating influence in cases that are resolved without trial).
74. I have not repeated at great length here the argument for a particular kind of
settlement (Pareto-optimal, problem-solving, negotiated settlement) that is less likely to lead
to unprincipled compromise than the most common litigation-shadowed compromise in the
face of an uncertain trial verdict. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 768-75.
75. See Luban, Settlements, supra note 7, at 2637.
76. For arguments that particular processes do have particular attributes, functions, and
morality, see generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1969) (discussing how
principles of morality apply to law); Fuller, Adjudication, supra note 30 (describing adjudica-
tion as form of social ordering); Fuller, Mediation, supra note 30 (describing characteristics
of mediation); Lon L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 1
(describing appropriate role for arbitration).
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of precedent in settlement processes. Implicit in Owen Fiss's classic article
(and one of the most trenchant of his criticisms) is the concern that too
many settlements will reduce the making of law or provide an insufficient
"sample" of cases from which the courts will draw to fashion rules to
govern human behavior. 77 Settlement, it is argued, is used to avoid both of
the key elements of a legal system based on stare decisis-governance by
existing rules and the enunciation of new rules from the public application
of rules to new facts. Indeed, one could extend this argument and be
concerned, as is David Luban, Laura Nader, and others, that it is precisely
the important "public" sort of cases that are increasingly being shielded
from formal court treatment, by the recent increased use of settlements in
mass torts and consumer class actions.
These issues of the loss of precedent are explored in a number of
discrete legal areas. In the context of arbitration, there has long been a
spirited debate about the role of law in the interpretation of collective
bargaining agreements, contracts, and general dispute resolution, with a
general concern that arbitration is characterized more by its arbitrariness
or interpretation of party agreements than public law. 78 Recent Supreme
Court rulings sustaining the use of arbitration, however, seem to credit
arbitration with a respect for and an ability to apply and interpret complex
legal rules. 79 Recently, proceduralists have become concerned about the
removal of precedent by vacatur, following a postadjudication settlement,
or in California, the depublication of decisions following settlement or a
subsequent court order.8" Here the arguments turn on who "owns" the
precedent. Do the parties, whose dispute is being settled, or the public,
who needs guidance from enunciated rules, control the judgment?
Once again, these concerns are based on different understandings of the
role of courts and dispute resolution. For those, like Luban, who see
77. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 1085-87.
78. For an overview of arbitration law, see generally LEO KANOWITZ, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1986); IAN MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION
LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION AND INTERNATIONALIZATION (1992).
79. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (age discrimina-
tion); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (RICO and
securities laws); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985) (antitrust); cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (holding that
arbitration cannot preclude litigation of statutory rights under employment discrimination
laws).
80. See Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and
the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471 (1994)
(reviewing tensions and potential complexities in vacatur by consent); see also United States
Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 S. Ct. 386 (1994) (holding that
settlement after filing of appeal or petition for certiorari does not justify vacatur of civil
judgment under review); Neary v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119 (Cal. 1992)
(holding California appellate courts have power to vacate trial court judgments if parties so
stipulate as condition of settlement).
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adjudication as our public discourse, a case, once filed, becomes the
property of the polity and is the matriel out of which we fashion our social,
legal, political, and maybe even moral contracts. For those who regard our
legal system as a public service for private dispute resolution,8I or as a
"democratic and participatory" party initiated system, the dispute and its
resolution remain the property of the parties and can be removed from the
system in any way, as long as the parties consent.8" In a sense we could ask:
"Whose Dispute Is It, Anyway?" 83 To whom does a dispute belong when it
enters the legal system? Whose "property" is a particular dispute, and who
should decide how it should be treated?84
However these important jurisprudential issues are resolved, it is impor-
tant to observe here that settlements are affected by precedent-both in
the ratio decidendi of arriving at particular solutions and in the creation of
new precedents. Precedent makes its voice heard and power felt in every
settlement, if only because one reason the parties may choose to settle is to
avoid the effects of previous lawmaking. Yet just as often, settlement may
be based on the uncertainty of knowing the legal result, especially if
precedent is unclear or contradictory.85 To charge that settlement is ungov-
erned by precedent is to be grossly insensitive to the contexts in which
settlements occur. For example, repeat play arbitrations and mediations
are sensitive not only to the "norms" created by numerous repeat cases,
86
81. Whether dispute resolution is a private or public good remains a much argued
question. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private
Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979); Luban, Settlements, supra note 7; Shavell, supra note 16,
at 2.
82. For a thoughtful review of factors to consider in deciding when a dispute belongs in
the "public domain" for disclosure purposes, see Judge Sloviter's opinion in Bank of Am.
Nat'l Trust & Sav. Assoc. v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc., 800 F.2d. 339, 345-46 (3d Cir. 1986).
For a view that settlement processes are private and for the parties only, see Cincinnati Gas
& Elec. Gas Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 903-04 (6th Cir. 1988).
83. Apologies to the author of Whose Life Is It Anyway?. BRIAN CLARK, WHOSE LIFE IS IT
ANYWAY? (1979) (exploring tensions between doctor and patient in controlling decisions
about medical treatment, with obvious parallels to legal decisionmaking, both at microlevel
between lawyer and client and concerns of macrolevel choices about what is justice).
84. Though I do not explore it at length in this essay, these issues lend themselves to a
more systematic analysis of the property interests implicated in dispute resolution, including
the legal, not just economic, rights and interests involved in dispute resolution. See generally
Nils Christie, Conflicts As Property, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1977) (arguing that conflicts
have independent value).
85. See George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learning from Wittman's
Mistakes, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 215 (1985) (advocating predictive model of which disputes will
be litigated or settled); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (analyzing relationship between legal standard and
rate of success of plaintiffs).
86. Such arbitrations and mediations exist in labor arbitration, child custody, and divorce
mediation (where "precedent" is often felt in the bargaining endowments of court schedules
for child and spousal support), construction and entertainment disputes, securities arbitra-
tion, fee disputes, farmer-creditor disputes, and, increasingly, torts (both routine auto
accidents in insurance or court contexts and mass torts).
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but increasingly to published reports of settlements. 87 In the last ten years,
a variety of legal publishing services have begun to report the results, not
only of verdicts, but of settlements as well.88 While these reports tend to be
simply of monetary amounts and vary enormously by region and other
contextual factors,89 they are used by practicing lawyers to guide their
demands, settlements, and litigation decisions just as reported decisions
do. These reports may not include the kind of elaborated legal reasoning
contemplated by David Luban's public discourse about the law, but they
provide at least as much guidance as jury verdicts and unreported judicial
decisions. As a repeat play arbitrator myself in the Dalkon Shield litiga-
tion, I write opinions requiring both legal conclusions and fact-findings
that must be elaborated and over time necessarily become affected and
"constrained" by the equity of decisions in other, similar cases. Increas-
ingly, as cases of significant public importance are covered in the news,
both the precedential and publicity effects of settlements may well exceed
those of reported decisions, and the public (including Luban's public
realm) may be more informed than if precedents were left totally to lawyer
access and interpretation. 90
87. Labor arbitration awards have long been published by the Bureau of National Affairs
(BNA) and Commerce Clearing House (CCH).
88. Settlements are reported by: LEXIS Verdicts Library, consisting of verdict and
settlement reports from the Association of Trial Lawyers of America; Jury Verdict Research,
Inc.; National Law Journal's Annual Verdict and Settlement Review; and a wide variety of
state-wide and local verdict and settlement reporters and services. Local legal newspapers
such as the L.A. Daily Journal publish weekly or monthly lists of settlements, as well as
"unreported" verdicts. The California Confidential Report for Attorneys purports to be a
report of jury trials, settlements, and arbitrations for all eight Southern California counties,
contributed by the attorneys of record, and published as a "guide for practicing attorneys."
See also Shepard's/McGraw Hill, Inc.'s Verdicts, Settlements and Tactics (1988-current); JAS
Publications' Metro Verdicts Monthly (Washington, DC, Maryland, and Virginia, 1989-
current) (all available online). My thanks to Adrienne Adan, Law Librarian, UCLA for
locating many of these sources. A variety of specialty professional associations also research,
gather, and publish information about recent verdicts, settlements, and other dispositions of
legal cases, in sources like the Products Liability Reporter and the Medical Malpractice
Reporter. NEXIS also reports on settlements. See William G. Harrington, Being Better
Informed -Electronically: Beyond Computerized Legal Research, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 1, 1985, at
14.
89. See Andrew Blum, What's A Leg Worth? It Depends, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 1, 1988, at 1.
90. As examples, one has only to look at the recent press coverage of the breast implant
litigation, see David R. Olmos & Henry Weinstein, Breast Implant Settlement in Peril, L.A.
TIMES, May 5, 1995, at 1, a multicompany asbestos producers consortium settlement of
asbestos cases, see Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994), recent
refusals of courts to accept settlements or consent decrees, see Judge Sporkin's opinion in
the Microsoft antitrust proceeding, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318
(D.D.C.), rev'd, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and rejection of recent car consumer class
actions, see Jesus Sanchez & Donald W. Nauss, Court Rejects GM Settlement on Value of
Pickup Trucks; Autos, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1995, at D1. Indeed several years ago when the
Southern California chapter of the Legal Defense Fund settled a housing discrimination
case, it did so with a press conference specifically designed to announce the precedential
effects of the largest settlement ever in a housing discrimination suit. See Penelope McMil-
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One could ask, given the proliferation of precedents by overburdened
courts, if it might make sense to consider whether there is an optimal
amount of court production of precedents and law to facilitate just the sort
of public discourse that "adjudication" advocates, like Professor Luban,
desire. Some settlement might then facilitate an "equilibrium"'" level of
appropriate numbers and quality of judicial production to have the kind of
reasoned public discourse contemplated. Thus, settlement, both by its
increased use of publicity in important cases, and its ability to remove
some cases from the system, might actually improve the quality of public
discourse or lawmaking in the public realm, more broadly conceived of,
than in traditional adjudication.
C. THE PERILS AND NECESSITY OF SECRECY IN SETTLEMENTS
As Professor Luban's essay makes clear, we can no longer contemplate a
world without adjudication or without settlement-both are necessary to
provide private citizens some opportunity to choose how they want their
disputes resolved and to ensure that those cases that reach court can be
fairly and thoroughly treated,92 producing the kind of public discourse that
Luban contemplates. Thus, Luban's argument reduces to an argument not
against settlement (for that has implicitly been conceded to necessity if not
political preference or morality) but against private settlement. Luban
contends that settlement should serve the same law-generating and politi-
cal discourse functions that he contemplates for adjudication. This argu-
ment is appealing, but alas it is too simple, reductionist, and I submit,
antidemocratic to succeed fully.
Ian, L.A. Housing Bias Suit Settled for $450,000, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1990, at 1; Interview
with Patrick Patterson, Esq. (Feb. 21, 1990).
91. In an important essay, George Priest has suggested that litigation delays are likely to
reach certain equilibria: when the queues for trial get too long there will be more ADR and
settlement activity as parties become impatient for outcomes. As more settlement and ADR
accumulate and trial times decrease, more litigants will opt for trial until the wait becomes
too long again. George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U.
L. REV. 527 (1989). In a sense, Priest is making a market argument for the use of ADR.
Competition between ADR and adjudication should result in an "optimal" time for case
disposition as determined by party choice. One could argue that a similar analysis could be
made for the production of precedents. Judges may encourage ADR that does not require
the writing of decisions until there is enough time to write thoughtfully and fully on what
remains. This, of course, does raise important issues about the bases and standards for court
referral to ADR as a precedent-avoiding strategy. See Macey, supra note 16, at 634-35
(arguing that judges have wide discretion to force settlements); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Judicial Referral to ADR: Issues and Problems Faced by Judges, FJC DIRECTIONS, Dec. 1994, at
8, 8-9 (describing issues involved in selecting cases for ADR).
92. Need I say more than if every criminal case were tried as the O.J. Simpson case, we
would have virtually no civil courts in America. Indeed, District Attorney Gill Garcetti has
already opined that within the next year as the "three strikes and you're out" law takes effect
in California there will be virtually no room for civil trials in the 581 county courtrooms in
Los Angeles. See Large Load of "3 Strikes" Cases Filed By Prosecutors, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23,
1994, at B2.
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Consider two of the most successful international negotiations of our
modern political life-Camp David and the Norwegian facilitation of the
PLO-Israeli accords. In both instances, early advances to create an environ-
ment for negotiation and the negotiation itself required privacy and se-
crecy lest warring factions learned of what was in store and literally
"killed" the possibility of a deal (and the negotiators as well). 9 3 When
representatives in a dispute have constituencies of widely different views of
the case, and when meeting with the "enemy" itself is considered a signal
of weakness, negotiations will simply not occur unless they can be held in
privacy.
Thus, while critics like Luban and others94 call for the full public airing
of the fact-finding and discovery process, as well as outcomes in settle-
ments, they focus exclusively on the needs and interests of those other
than the immediate parties to the particular dispute. Professor Luban
argues that settlements, like "[a]ll actions relating to the rights of other
human beings are wrong if their maxim is incomlatible with publicity."95
Luban states that this "publicity principle lies at the core of democratic
political morality.",96 Though I will not argue that every litigant has a right
to keep his or her settlement totally private, I think it is antidemocratic
and ultimately harmful to our legal and political system to insist that all
disputes be publicly aired. Some would draw the distinction that once a
case is filed in a public forum, such as a court, the parties have waived
their rights to privatize their disputes. To the extent that many parties now
93. See generally JIMMY CARTER, KEEPING FAITH (1982); Herbert C. Kelman, Contribu-
tions of an Unofficial Conflict Resolution Effort to the Israeli-Palestinian Breakthrough, 11
NEGOTIATION J. 19 (1995) (reviewing role of problem-solving workshops in peace talks);
Katherine W. Meighan, Note, The Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles: Prelude to a Peace?,
34 VA. J. INT'L L. 435 (1994) (analyzing negotiation process leading to Israel-PLO agree-
ment); Jeffery Jacobson, Farmhouse Diplomacy: The Mediation Process of the Israel-PLO
Declaration of Principles (May 19, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Georgetown
Law Journal) (analyzing negotiating environment of Israel-PLO talks).
94. At various times both Professors Resnik and Yeazell have also argued against the
"privatization" of fact-finding and the discovery process. See Resnik, Failing Faith, supra
note 4, at 538; Yeazell, supra note 5, at 650; see also Laura Macklin, Promoting Settlements,
Foregoing the Facts, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 575 (1986) (discussing advantages of
judicial fact-finding). The Association of Trial Lawyers of America (among other groups) has
been mounting a national and state campaign to pass open settlement statutes, as well as
change rules of procedure to shift the burden of proof in protective orders. See Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 27 (surveying proposed open settlement laws); Arlin R. Thrush, Public
Health and Safety Hazards Versus Confidentiality: Expanding the Mediation Door of the Multi-
Door Courthouse, 1994 J. Dtsp. RESOL. 235 (surveying increased access to information in
public hazard context); see also TEX. R. Civ. P. ANN. r. 76a (West 1995) (limiting instances
in which court records may be sealed); FLA. STAT. ch. 69.081 (1990) (prohibiting agreements
that have effect of concealing public hazards). But cf. Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality,
Protective Orders and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARv. L. REV. 427 (1991) (defending
need for protective orders against abuses of discovery rules).
95. Luban, Settlements, supra note 7, at 2648 (citing IMMANUEL KANT, KANT'S POLITICAL
WRITINGS 126 (Hans Reiss ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., 1970)).
96. Id.
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use private dispute resolution providers, such as JAMS-ENDISPUTE, 97 to
avoid public decisionmaking, one draws a dangerous line because parties
seeking to privatize their disputes will simply avoid the public courts
completely,9" and we will defeat the very purposes Luban wishes to serve
by public settlements. If, as Luban suggests, secret settlements cause
parties to "fob off" the costs of their settlements on to others (externaliz-
ing settlements by passing on costs to consumers, or forcing all litigants to
bear the costs of discovery for similar transactions), then a legal system
that requires full disclosure of all discovered facts and all the terms of
settlements in every case likely will lead to a "private market" in dispute
resolution (if it hasn't already, assisted by other factors such as the cost
and delay in the public dispute resolution system).99
More important, the publicity in litigation and settlement argument
seems to assume that only defendants (particularly those in products
liability litigation) want to keep information secret. In fact, plaintiffs in
sexual harassment, defamation, and employment cases, as well as some
tort cases, have strong interests in not publicizing the underlying facts of
their cases, even if they win, and most certainly if their alleged facts are
not "sustained." Luban rejects the argument that a plaintiff with AIDS
would not be considered a "public health and safety hazard" and claims
that protective orders would offer some confidentiality. I am not as sure.
Thus, some interests of party privacy and autonomy must be balanced
against public and system needs. If everyone who files a lawsuit subjects
himself to full disclosure by the state or media we would not be far from
the world of 1984.l00
Not all settlements can be public, or they simply will not occur. Thus,
the harder issue is to decide how we can regulate settlements so that both
public and private values of our legal and political system can be accommo-
dated. From my perspective, Luban glosses too quickly over the question
of what should be made the subject of public discourse in legal dispute
97. JAMS (Judicial, Arbitration, and Mediation Services) is a private dispute resolution
service founded by retired judges. It has merged with ENDISPUTE, a service created by
private lawyers and other dispute resolution professionals. Some have suggested that with
the merger, ENDISPUTE'S employment of lawyers enables those who seek to be judges to
do so without any formal appointment, confirmation, or service to the public court system.
98. Bryant Garth has argued that we can already see the effects of a public-private
competition over dispute resolution services. See Bryant G. Garth, Privatization and the New
Market for Disputes: A Framework for Analysis and a Preliminary Assessment, 12 STUD. L. POL.
& Soc'x 367 (1992) (describing and evaluating institutions for private dispute resolution);
see also Lauren K. Robel, Private Justice and the Federal Bench, 68 IND. L.J. 891 (1993)
(considering effect of privatization on federal judges).
99. For example, in California many repeat play litigants, such as insurance companies, go
directly to services such as JAMS-ENDISPUTE for their claims.
100. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1948). As the spectacle of the O.J. Simpson trial reveals, no
detail, whether of truth or speculation, will be spared if the case proves interesting enough.
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resolution. To the extent that good settlement (and here I am referring to
my own "problem-solving conception," criticized by Luban as a merely
"instrumentalist" conception of dispute resolution) 10 1 requires the revela-
tion of what I call "nonlegally relevant facts," such as the parties' real and
underlying needs and interests (including such factors as emotional needs
and motives, future business needs, financial data, trade secrets, psychologi-
cal and social issues like risk aversion, and precedential effects for other
employees or family members), 10 2 open settlement processes will severely
limit the willingness of parties to settle cases for "other factors" than those
that are simply legal.
In short, Luban's claim for public settlements commits two democratic
errors. First, it privileges the group's (or society's) need for public dis-
course over the needs (dare I say rights) of individuals to seek the most
comprehensive and Pareto optimal solution possible to their dispute, by
sharing information that is beyond or different from what a court might
order them to reveal. "Settlement facts" may indeed be different from
"adjudication facts," and individual settlement needs may be different
from the public's or groups' "right to know." Luban's second error is to
assume (once again) that all cases, settlements, and adjudications should
be "resolved" by reference to law or legally relevant .principles or legally
discoverable facts. Thus Luban's conception of dispute resolution, while
described as democratic and organized around the public realm and public
discourse, privileges law and legal principles as the only "just" way to
resolve a dispute. Other information (which might not be revealed in such
an open settlement process) is simply irrelevant.
Luban's analysis of the "outcomes" and treatments of two recent settle-
ments further underscores the greater complexity of the subject at hand.
What should be done publicly and what privately in our legal system has
consumed scholars for many years. 0 3 I do not believe that all that is wrong
with settlements and right with adjudication can be corrected by opening
all disputes to publicity. I have written elsewhere at length about Georgine
v. Amchem Products, Inc., 104 and I suggest here that if the negotiations
were not private there would have been no settlement at all. Thus, what-
101. Luban, Settlements, supra note 7, at 2633.
102. The elaboration of these categories of needs and interests can be found in Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 9, at 795-804.
103. See generally Symposium, The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289
(1982) (debating borders of public and private action). Additionally, feminists have offered
important arguments about the public-private splits in political discourse, as well as legal
entitlements. See, e.g., SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY (1989) (arguing
that market-family dichotomy is flawed and perpetuates inequalities between women and
men); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983) (arguing that most efforts to reform women's lives have been
constrained by view of market-family dichotomy).
104. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 12.
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ever may be wrong with the substance of that settlement, 10 5 the results of
that settlement must be compared to no settlement at all, or what might
have occurred in adjudication, which in that case likely would have meant
many years of waiting to be heard; a particularly harsh consequence for
those claimants who were dying and might not have received legal relief.
Thus it is not "publicity" of the settlement that is the key to reform;
what is necessary is a set of standards for scrutinizing both the settlement
process and the settlement outcome. I have argued for a multitiered
inquiry into such settlements, first when the negotiations begin (through
such standards as adequacy of counsel, and proper consent to representa-
tion by class representatives), and then again when the negotiation is
concluded (closer scrutiny of the substantive justice of the outcome, at
least in those cases, like class action settlements, which require court
approval or in which court approval is sought by the parties). °6 In situa-
tions in which mass numbers of cases affect the functioning of the public
litigation system or the public interest is obviously involved or implicated
in court action (such as in the seeking of court approval of the Justice
Department settlement in the Microsoft antitrust litigation),1"7 appropri-
ate scrutiny of the settlement is in order.
This scrutiny is different, however, than requiring that all aspects of a
complex and difficult negotiation occur in public. Even in the breast
implant cases, in which there was greater publicity and more open represen-
tation of various subclasses of litigants, most of the actual negotiations (at
which confidential financial data and litigation projections were discussed)
were conducted in private.10 8 Free, open, and candid assessments of claims
and offers of settlement on both conventional and more creative "problem-
solving" bases are not likely to occur in the public eye for a number of
reasons. For me, the key in evaluating when and how settlement should
occur is not a question of publicity or confidentiality, but one of appropri-
ate substantive and process "justice" standards, taking account of the
interests of both the parties-disputants and others who are likely to be
affected by the outcome, including in some cases, the whole polity. Given
the extent to which important public issues are covered in the media today,
total secrecy is less possible. Press coverage and open court hearings in
105. Critics argue that future claimants with pleural thickening and no current physical
impairments have fared less well than current clients with such thickening whose cases were
settled as part of a different settlement. Thus, the claims are that there were both conflicts of
interests and collusion in the mass tort settlement of 20 asbestos producers (CCR) with tens
of thousands of asbestos claimants. See Susan Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps:
Georgine v. Amchem Products, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1040 (1995).
106. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 12, at 1217-19.
107. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
108. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. Civ.A.CV-94-P-11558-S,
1994 WL 578353 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994).
[Vol. 83:26632686
WHOSE DISPUTE IS IT ANYWAY?
prominent cases do facilitate the kind of public discourse Professor Luban
suggests.109
D. SETTLEMENTS OFTEN PROVIDE GREATER, NOT LESSER, POSSIBILITIES
FOR JUST RESULTS
Much of the critique of settlement rests on claims that negotiated
settlements, more than adjudicated claims, will be determined by the raw'
bargaining power of one party over another. Assumptions abound here
that power imbalances do not occur at trial, or if they do, they can be
corrected by the neutral third party cloaked in a judge's robe. l1 ° Yet
several commentators have argued that without a neutral third party
watching their behavior, negotiators ought to adhere to a higher standard
of ethical care and concern for the other, behaving in a trustworthy
manner and not agreeing to unconscionable results.'' Others have argued
that certain forms of settlement processes, particularly mediation, are
most effective at dealing with power imbalances and correcting informa-
tion asymmetries by using a neutral third party to guide the process." 2
Both the scholarly and professional literature on mediation processes
more explicitly address the issue of how to take account of, deal with, and
"balance" power inequalities during the actual mediation process. 13 Given
109. It should be noted that none of these cases is "over." All are still pending in trial or
appellate courts or await further agency action. Indeed, one could argue that journalistic
attention to these cases has expanded the nature of the public discourse by including more
members of the general public in the debates about the cases, rather than leaving the issues
only to the lawyers and judges involved.
110. Both Owen Fiss and Richard Delgado make the explicit claim that judges will
neutralize power imbalances in the courtroom by questioning witnesses or reminding the
parties of their duties to act fairly. See Delgado et al., supra note 3, at 1368-69; Fiss, supra
note 1, at 1077.
111. See, e.g., Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66
CAL. L. REV. 669 (1978) (attempting to set out code of conduct for lawyer acting as client
representative outside of the courtroom setting); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Settlement
Black Box, Paper delivered at Boston University Law School (Oct. 1994) (on file with The
Georgetown Law Journal) (discussing inadequate representation claims in settlement con-
text). Attempts to formalize such standards in the attorneys' code of ethics, the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, were ultimately unsuccessful.
112. See Jennifer G. Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 VA. L.
REV. 323 (1994) (suggesting mediators can decrease impact of power imbalance by control-
ling flow of parties' private information); Albie Davis & Richard A. Salem, Dealing With
Power Imbalances in the Mediation of Interpersonal Disputes, 6 MEDIATION Q. 17 (1984);
Howard Raiffa, Post-Settlement Settlements, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 323 (J.
William Breslin & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1991) (proposing scheme in which mediator
proposes second settlement attempt to satisfy both parties).
113. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 9, At 262-71 (describing mediation training that
encourages empowerment); JONATHAN G. SHAILOR, EMPOWERMENT IN DISPUTE MEDIATION:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF COMMUNICATION (1994) (analyzing roles of empowerment and
neutrality in mediation); WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST No: NEGOTIATING WITH DIFFICULT
PEOPLE (1991) (setting out negotiation strategies); Samuel B. Bacharach & Edward J.
Lawler, Power Dependence and Power Paradoxes in Bargaining, 2 NEGOTIATION J. 167, 171-73
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the sometimes vast disparities of resources in the formal litigation arena, it
seems odd to argue that adjudication is a better democratic leveler. Per-
haps this would be true if most cases were heard by Fissian judicial power
balancers, but even in those few cases that are heard by judges (and
juries), it is often private (not public) resources, rather than justice or
evenly matched "public discourse," which control case presentation, mo-
bilization of proof, and thus, victory."14 Indeed, it has often struck me as
somewhat ironic that one of the consequences of the Due Process revolu-
tion15 has been the growing expense, complexity, and formality of hear-
ings that have made some forms of adjudicative and administrative justice
more expensive and remote to would-be claimants.116
Furthermore, recent commentators have noted the possibilities of some
forms of settlement processes to provide greater, rather than lesser, oppor-
tunities for direct conversation, confrontation, and catharsis than court
hearings. 1 7 Judge Weinstein has spoken of the need for tort victims to
express their pain and anger and has suggested that some forms of ADR
may fulfill this need better than either formal court hearings (which may
be impossible in mass cases) or attorney-negotiated settlements in which
the actual parties have little opportunity to participate.11 My own experi-
ence as an arbitrator in the Dalkon Shield Litigation Trust suggests to me
that private hearings in which claimants can tell their stories (when, as in
those cases, the stories are of deeply personal and private matters) directly
to a representative of the "defendant" with a third party present serve
both cathartic and justice functions that are ill-served by overly formal and
public hearings (which discourage some claimants from pursuing their
claims) and by totally lawyer-dominated, bilateral negotiations in which
(1986) (analyzing power relationship based on dependence); Leo F. Smyth, Intractable
Conflicts and the Role of Identity, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 311, 314 (1994) (discussing various
means of altering power relationship between parties). See generally Lerman, supra note 2, at
102-06 (discussing how informal settlement process can be made sensitive to power imbal-
ances).
114. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974) (noting that repeat players in
litigation have great strategic and distributional advantages in adjudication).
115. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (granting due process protections to
welfare recipients); cf. Symposium, The Legacy of Goldberg v. Kelly: A Twenty Year Perspec-
tive, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 729 (1990) (evaluating current state of due process protections).
116. Of course, the impulses behind the procedural revolution were actually a desire for
greater substantive justice. Cf. MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE
WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973 (1995) (tracing history of welfare and due process
reform); Sylvia A. Law, Some Reflections on Goldberg v. Kelly at Twenty Years, 56 BROOK. L.
REV. 805, 819-20 (1990) (citing Justice Brennan's view that situation involving "brutal
poverty" required hearing).
117. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 9, at 145-74 (describing how mediators should
encourage parties to tell their stories as means of empowerment).
118. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 20, at 47-48 (suggesting application of communitarian and
communicatarian ethics in some mass tort cases).
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parties may have little participatory role. Thus, not all settlement or
settlement processes are the same, and claims that either adjudication or
public settlement will better serve all party "justice" interests are overly
simplistic.l i9
To the extent that certain kinds of settlement processes include more
participation by the parties, they may also facilitate greater democratic
participation in the legal system than the stylized ritual dominated by
lawyers that is the formal adjudication system. To the extent that at least
some forms of facilitated settlement, including mediation, minitrials, and
some settlement conferences, involve greater, rather than lesser, participa-
tion from the actual disputants, "control" of the dispute by the parties
involved may make some forms of dispute resolution more responsive to
parties', rather than professionals', interests. Especially when some of the
forms of facilitated negotiation and settlement permit participation by
more than just two parties (i.e., multiparty and public policy dispute
mediations), 2 ° direct conversation, confrontation, and "discourse" of all
parties actually involved in a dispute will be far richer and more participa-
tory than the two-sided conventional adversary mode.121
When used flexibly and with sufficient information, "appropriate dispute
119. Critics, like Richard Delgado, who suggest that only formal or public proceedings can
satisfy both party and system needs for confrontation of wrongdoing seem to be (somewhat
ironically in Delgado's case) ignoring the claims that narratives and storytelling (which can
be told in greater contextual complexity in informal proceedings) may serve important
functions in the recognition of harm and empathic responses to emotional, as well as legal,
claims and harms. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea
for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989) (examining use of stories in struggle for racial
reform); see also PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991)
(presenting essays on race and gender in narrative form); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call
of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991) (studying use of feminist narratives); Toni M. Massaro,
Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2099 (1989) (advocating use of empathy and stories in legal scholarship); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, The Power of Narrative in Empathetic Learning: Post-Modernism and the Stories of
Law, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 287 (1992) (reviewing PATRICA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF
RACE AND RIGHTS (1991)). For a powerful argument about the ironies of Delgado's
anti-ADR positions and his claims for narrative and storytelling, see generally Dana R.
Carter, From Mali to America: Looking At Alternative Dispute Resolution as a Place for
Legal Narrative, Empathy and Understanding (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
The Georgetown Law Journal).
120. See generally LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY L. CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IM-
PASSE: CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES (1987) (describing and
advocating negotiated approaches to consensus building); Gary Goodpaster, Coalitions and
Representative Bargaining, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 243 (1994) (describing bargaining
dynamics of coalitions).
121. In another paper, I have argued that adversary discourse, of the sort Luban extols in
his paper, may actually thwart democratic and rigorous discourse. See generally Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 58. Not all questions have only two sides, and the adversarial process
(and the debate mode) are not necessarily the best ways to illuminate complex, multifaceted
issues. Consider health care reform, our policy in Bosnia, and affirmative action as some
examples.
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resolution" allows parties to choose how they want their dispute resolved.
Thus, any argument for adjudication over settlement must explain why
placing the disputing apparatus in the hands of professionals, over the
disputants, is more democratic.122 1 issue this challenge with several impor-
tant caveats. First, not all settlement processes reflect this ideology of
party determination or control. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere,
12 3
current use of some forms of ADR in the courts has resulted in co-
optation of some of the party control values; feeling pressure to speed case
processing, courts treat ADR bureaucratically and sometimes mandatorily,
reducing party choice about process. When, however, parties (and their
lawyers) are given an informed choice about different ways to resolve their
disputes, such "multidoor" courthouses would seem to be far more "demo-
cratic" than adjudication or a coerced "public" settlement by allowing
parties to consider what process seems most appropriate for their dis-
pute.124 Parties (with the expert advice of lawyers) 125 can decide how much
"public discourse" or confidentiality they need to resolve their dispute,
how much direct confrontation or conversation they want with the other
side, and how much flexibility they want to work out possible solutions that
a court would not be authorized to award. Thus, both party choice about
122. See generally BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 9 (arguing that disputants can be "trans-
formed" by mediation ethically, politically, humanistically, and morally, through more direct
communication with each other, in ways that they are not affected by more formal adjudica-
tory processes).
123. See generally Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement, supra note 8, at 18-30 (discussing
difficulties of incorporating ADR into adversary system); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The
Future of Civil Litigation; Dream or Nightmare? Lessons From the American Experience, in
SHAPING THE FUTURE: NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL SERVICES (Roger Smith ed., 1995); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of Ideologies, Paradigms,
and Practices, 11 NEGOTIATION J. 217 (1995) (reviewing accomplishments and potential of
mediation in practice).
124. There is obviously an important issue about how to choose a process when the parties
differ among themselves about which process to use. See, e.g., Stephanie Smith, Obtaining
Maximum Benefit from ADR Phone Conferences, AsS'N Bus. TRIAL L. REP., Mar. 1995, at 1-2
(describing counseling by court ADR administrators).
125. Lawyers may, by the way, have conflicting interests in counseling which processes are
best for the parties. Not only does the contingent fee structure affect incentives for lawyers
to treat cases in particular ways, see Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, An
Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125
(1970) (concluding that contingent fees do not necessarily align interests of lawyers and
clients), but different settlement processes provide different financial incentives for lawyers
as well. A streamlining Early Neutral Evaluation Program, for example, may result in fewer
depositions and cut down the hours available for billing. In the Early Neutral Evaluation
Program utilized by the Northern District of California, lawyers for both parties meet with
third party neutrals (volunteer lawyers) to present facts and key issues in dispute to obtain
an early assessment of the case (both for settlement purposes and to set discovery schedule).
See Rosenberg & Folberg, supra note 39. New billing practices imposed by powerful clients
have created greater financial incentives for the settlement process. See, e.g., Robert E. Litan
& Steven C. Salop, Reforming the Lawyer-Client Relationship Through Alternative Billing
Methods, 77 JUDICATURE 191 (1994) (describing alternatives to hourly billing such as blended
partner/associate rates and fixed fees).
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process and the particular kinds of solutions chosen are at least theoreti-
cally, if not always in practice, more democratic (at least for the parties)
than the compulsory adjudication or public settlement process critics like
Luban and others suggest.
E. SETTLEMENTS MAY PROVIDE DEEPER AND RICHER ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Some forms of ADR and settlement policies also provide the potential,
if not yet the reality, of greater access to justice. If a variety of ways of
resolving disputes becomes available, not all parties will line up for the
same processes or choose the same dispute resolvers or rule enunciators.
Indeed, some judges have welcomed their roles as "social justice bureau-
crats" or "public problem solvers," helping parties choose an appropriate
process or becoming more active in case handling and settlement.'26 If
properly monitored and regulated (and that is one of the roles of the
academic critic like Professor Luban and myself, across our similar con-
cerns but factual and philosophical differences), these new processes offer
the potential of making more, rather than less, justice available, both in
terms of processes available and the variety of outcomes that may be
achieved.
The key issue in the differences between Professor Luban and myself
then, seems to turn on "democratic" dispute processes for whom-the
disputants themselves or the larger society with a potential interest in how
particular disputes are resolved. This difference, if important, may also be
somewhat intractable. It is reflected in the current differences of expert
opinion on whether or not the settlements of mass torts like asbestos and
breast implants through private class action settlements were appropriate
or not. 27 For me the answer lies not in whether the process used should
have been full adjudication or settlement, or even if the negotiations
should have been conducted in public or not. The key issue is by what
standards should we (the courts, the public, and academic critics) judge
the processes chosen and the ultimate results. When is a settlement just
and to whom must it appear so?
III. MAKING THE CASE FOR BETTER SETTLEMENTS IN BOTH THE
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC REALM
To recapitulate, I have tried to argue that settlements are not inherently
inferior to adjudicated outcomes, as critics like Professor Luban seem to
126. Such judges include Jack B. Weinstein (E.D.N.Y.), Richard Ensalen (W.D. Mich.),
Arthur Spiegel (S.D. Ohio), Thomas Lambros (N.D. Ohio), and Sam Pointer (Ala.) to name
a few. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 12, at 1183; see also Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra
note 4, at 376-77 (surveying judicial participation and interest in ADR); Hornby, supra note
9, at 27-28 (discussing changing role of judges with advent of ADR).
127. See generally Cornell Symposium, supra note 12.
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suggest. (Even with his more narrowed focus on privacy in settlements,
Luban continues to see settlements as a necessary evil.) Just as adjudica-
tion is often romanticized when set off against settlement, and its better
features are elaborated, I have here tried to make the following arguments
on behalf of the "best" aspects of settlement:
1. Settlements that are in fact consensual represent the goals of demo-
cratic and party-initiated legal regimes by allowing the parties them-
selves to choose processes and outcomes for dispute resolution.
2. Settlements permit a broader range of possible solutions that may be
more responsive to both party and system needs.
128
3. What some consider to be the worst of settlement, that is, compro-
mise, may actually represent a moral commitment to equality, preci-
sion in justice, accommodation, and peaceful coexistence of conflicting
interests.
4. Settlements may be based on important nonlegal principles or inter-
ests, which may, in any given case, be as important or more important
to the parties than "legal" considerations. Laws made in the aggre-
gate may not always be appropriate in particular cases, and thus
settlements can be seen as yet another "principled" supplement to
our common law system.
5. Settlement processes may be more humanely "real," democratic, par-
ticipatory, and cathartic than more formalized processes, permitting
in their best moments, transformative and educational opportunities
for parties in dispute as well as for others.
6. Some settlement processes may be better adapted for the multiplex,
multiparty issues that require solutions in our modern society than the
binary form of plaintiff-defendant adjudication.
7. Despite the continuing and important debates about discovery and
information exchange in the litigation process, some settlement pro-
cesses (mediation and some forms of neutral case evaluation and
scheduling) may actually provide both more and better (not just
legally relevant) information for problem-solving, as well as "educa-
tion" of the litigants.
8. When used appropriately, settlement may actually increase access to
justice, not only by allowing more disputants to claim in different
ways, but also by allowing greater varieties of case resolutions.
128. I have not dealt here with Luban's significant claim that consensual two-party
settlements may externalize the costs and detriments of settlements onto "innocent" third
parties, such as taxpayers or others. This is an important point that requires both more
theoretical elaboration and empirical study.
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Thus, in its most idealized forms, settlement can be defended as being
participatory, democratic, empowering, educative, and transformative for
the parties.
Professor Luban would likely counter with-so what? Even if parties are
satisfied with settlements, 29 there is a public interest in every, or at least
many, private settlements. Furthermore, he would say, not all settlements
conform to the ideal type I have suggested here and elsewhere. Analyti-
cally, these are two separate questions, and thus they should be separately
considered: First, which "settlements," no matter how good they are for
the parties, should be subject to public scrutiny? Second, what factors can
we use to assess whether a settlement is properly arrived at, both for the
parties concerned and for whatever other interests may -be implicated in
the settlement? These are far more complicated questions, and I do not
think they lend themselves to easy answers. In closing this essay I will
suggest a few of my own thoughts, but I think it more important that
Professor Luban and I have set an agenda of issues to discuss and more
fully explore than that either one of us (or any of the other commentators
on this subject) have got it right.
A. TELLING A GOOD FROM A BAD SETTLEMENT
Taking the second question first (because it is easier and I have written
about it before), 3 ' it is important to consider settlements that depart from
the ideal form that I have sought to defend here. If settlements are not
consensually arrived at (through mandatory and coercive court pro-
grams,13 1 or because lawyers dominate decisionmaking, 3 2 or because the
choice is not real when one cannot afford to wait to litigate,"' or becausethere are such vast disparities between the parties that "consent" cannot
129. We have highly contradictory data on this point. Most satisfaction studies show high
rates of satisfaction with almost any process studied, yet other studies suggest that parties
are happier with fora in which a third party does render a decision, like arbitration. See, e.g.,
E. Allan Lind et al., In The Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their
Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & Soc'y REV. 953 (1990) (reporting that
satisfaction levels varied with perceptions of procedural fairness and expectations of out-
comes and costs).
130. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 760-61.
131. See Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of
Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169 (1993) (arguing that
mandatory court-annexed arbitration programs do not increase access to justice and may
decrease access to justice for poorer litigants); Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 1993 J.
Disp. RESOL. 1 (surveying extent of compulsory ADR).
132. See Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the
Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979) (criticizing lawyer domination of decisionmak-
ing and advocating application of informed consent doctrine to lawyer-client relationship).
133. With "three strikes and you're out" legislation in the criminal arena, there will be
fewer and fewer civil courtrooms available in the "multidoor" courthouses of California.
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be given), 134 then we must question whether such a settlement should be
enforced. As ADR becomes institutionalized in courts, there is a danger
that people will "consent" to settlements because they feel they have no
real alternative.1 35 If there is no consent, an important value justifying
settlement is absent.
136
If settlements do not track the law because other interests are deemed
more important by the parties, then we should not intrude upon a private
settlement, unless that settlement violates another law of public impor-
tance. Thus, while I claim that law is not necessarily the measure of a good
settlement (and parties may choose to ignore particular legal endowments
when bargaining), 37 law may tell us when we have a bad settlement.138
B. WHEN SETITLEMENTS SHOULD BE PUBLIC
Professor Luban concludes his essay by suggesting that we need certain
settlements to be conducted in the public realm because they serve the
"public-life conception of legitimacy" of the legal system. Though he cites
the recent court-approved asbestos settlement in Georgine and the court-
denied settlement in the Microsoft antitrust action as examples of cases
that should have been conducted "in public," he fails to specify the criteria
for determining when a case belongs in the public realm. This, I believe, is
our next intellectual duty, and I find it no easier than the task of deciding
which cases should be allocated to which processes.139 One could argue
134. This raises all of the issues implicated in paternalistic judgments. See David Luban,
Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 454, 460 (arguing that in some cases
paternalism of lawyers toward clients is justified).
135. As a mediator in trial courts in Los Angeles, I have seen many cases in which parties
settle out of frustration, not consent, and on the basis of eliminating a nuisance, not on the
basis of any principle. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lawyer Negotiations: Theories and Reali-
ties-What We Learn from Mediation, 56 MOD. L. REV. 361 (1993) (reporting experiences
with real world behavior of participants in mediation clinic).
136. It is the question of client consent to settlement that makes approval of the recent
mass tort class action settlements so difficult. How can we measure the consent of a party
who may not even know he is injured? See the discussion of Georgine, supra note 90.
137. For example, parties may agree to pay more or less than court-suggested guidelines
in spousal or child support. See GARY FRIEDMAN, A GUIDE TO DIVORCE MEDIATION 48-50
(1993).
138. The most difficult aspect of assessing settlements here is that when settlements are
totally private (i.e., the parties have chosen private judges or mediators or have simply
settled on their own), there is no way of assessing whether any of the aforementioned
conditions have been violated. Of course, adjudication may also shift costs or effects to
"innocent" third parties, and there are no formal mechanisms for assessing whether that is
relevant to any judgment.
139. Although I attempted some time ago to specify some of the contextual factors to be
considered in how a case should be negotiated, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotia-
tion: A Study of Strategies in Search of a Theory, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 905, 927-28, I
have abandoned any notion that we can assign cases ex ante to particular processes. Cf.
Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly
Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 49 (1994) (attempting to identify
whether case is suitable for ADR).
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that although both of these cases did receive public attention and debate
in the widespread press coverage that has accompanied the litigation, it is
clear that the settlement negotiations themselves were, in both cases,
conducted largely in private and were shrouded in secrecy until concluded.
Because I disagree with Professor Luban that such settlement negotiations
can be conducted effectively in public (Would Bill Gates voluntarily dis-
close Microsoft's future marketing plans in a public negotiation about
what the appropriate market share in the software industry should be?),
the crucial questions for me are: When and how settlements should
become public, and what scrutiny should be given to them?
I suggest that we do have some measures for deciding this question. As
Judge Sloviter's decision in Rittenhouse makes clear, when the parties
themselves seek court imprimatur and approval of a settlement, then
secrecy, at least of the terms of the settlement, must be presumed to be
waived in the absence of some other important legal policy. Similarly, in
the case of class action settlements requiring court approval under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), courts must engage in some scrutiny of the
adequacy of counsel and the reasonableness of settlement. I have argued
that this scrutiny should include closer looks at both process and substan-
tive measures of the settlement process,140 and Judge Schwarzer has
drafted a new Rule 23(e) that attempts to codify the factors for that
scrutiny. 141 Nevertheless, there will be whole classes of cases that may
seem to implicate "public interests" that are not formally before the
courts. How then do we decide which settlements should be exposed to
public scrutiny? Like Professor Luban, I am persuaded that certain settle-
ments so implicate the interests of those beyond the dispute that some
"public" exposure of such cases may be a necessary part of our democratic
process. As I have suggested elsewhere, mass torts actions, by their very
nature, fall into this class of "public" cases not only because they affect
many potential victims, but because the sheer numbers of these cases have
had a significant impact on our justice system. 142
Nevertheless, sheer numbers is not really an adequate test. Many con-
sumer cases have involved substantial numbers of people and have been
adequately dealt with by more or less private settlements, either on a class
or individual basis. Employment discrimination cases, which some see as
important "public interest" cases that should be "tried" in public are, to
many victims of employment discrimination, cases that they want very
much constrained to private settlements for fear of exposure of compli-
cated employment records and history. What makes the Georgine and
Microsoft cases so interesting is that they raise questions about when party
140. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 12, at 1217-19.
141. See.Schwarzer, supra note 12, at 843.
142. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 12, at 1187.
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consent is not enough and about what path to follow when third party
objectors (excluded plaintiffs' lawyers in Georgine) or a neutral third party
(the judge in Microsoft) seek to disrupt party consent and call our attention
to interests the negotiating parties may have chosen to avoid or ignore.
Thus, I conclude by suggesting that Professor Luban has raised some
important questions for us, but he has not fully answered or elaborated
them. Empirical research does not yet support the notion that judicial
intervention in settlement necessarily makes for better settlements, 43 yet
we know that settlement has certainly become the most common form of
dispute resolution. By seeking to defend settlement at its best and to
provide some philosophical and democratic justification for it, I hope to
have illuminated some criteria by which we can judge when settlements
fulfill their purpose and when they fall short. At the core of this assess-
ment is a prior question about "possession" of the dispute. If the parties
"own" their dispute, then party consent must be our democratic justifica-
tion for settlement. If someone other than the parties (affected third
parties, the public) have an interest in the dispute, we must consider ways
to assess how our party-initiated and party-controlled legal system can be
adapted to take account of such interests and how those interests can be
raised. Because not all settlement processes are the same, we must con-
sider how much of the settlement process we will need to scrutinize-the
process itself? Only outcome fairness? For whom are cases settled?
Thus, while I join with Professor Luban in thinking that a "jurispru-
dence of settlement" is waiting to be invented and that it must be debated,
as here, in the "public realm," I believe that jurisprudence will be complex
and long in coming and we have "only just begun" to specify its questions.
143. See generally Galanter & Cahill, supra note 13.
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